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WHICH COURT?
ARNOLD B. ELKIND*
In railroad cases, perhaps more than in any other single branch of
civil litigation, the choice of the court represents a special problem requir-
ing and receiving from the astute practitioner sound analysis and intelligent
consideration.
THE STATUTORY MANDATE
The venue provision of the Federal Employers' Liability Act' per-
mits the plaintiff to bring his action in the district court of the United
States, in the district where the defendant resides, or in which the cause
of action arose, or in which the defendant is doing business at the time of
commencing such action. This jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the
State courts.
One of the mandates for attorneys representing injured plaintiffs
to capitalize on this broad choice of venue came from the late Mr.
Justice Jackson, when he said?.
"Unless there is some hidden meaning in the language Congress
has employed, the injured workman or his surviving dependents
may choose from the entire territory served by the railroad any
place in which to sue, and in which to choose either a federal or
a state court of which to ask his remedy. There is nothing which
requires a plaintiff to whom such a choice is given to exercise
it in a self-denying or large-hearted manner. There is nothing
to restrain use of that privilege, as all choices of tribunal are
commonly used by all plaintiffs to get away from judges who
are considered to be unsympathetic, and to get before those who
are considered more favorable; to get away from juries thought
to be small-minded in the matter of verdicts, and to get to those
thought to be generous; to escape courts whose procedures are
burdensome to the plaintiff, and to seek out courts whose pro-
cedures make the going easy."
For a number of years prior to the amendment of the Judicial Code
in 1948 attorneys representing injured railroad employees utilized the
choice of venue as a valid, powerful weapon, selecting for their venue those
jurisdictions in the large metropolitan areas where the dangers of a
penurious jury's verdict were least likely to occur. In the years prior to
1948 the usual problem on venue in a Federal Employers' Liability Act
cast was whether o rnot the railroad was doing business in the district which
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145 U.S.C. 56: "Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district
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at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United
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2 Miles v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 69S, 706.
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the plaintiff had selected. During those years several determinations were
made which may at some future date again have application but which,
in the light of later statutory enactments, must be regarded not because
of any present practical import but as historical phenomena.
The Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., with lines only in the southwestern
United States, was held to be doing business in the Southern District of
New York and an action was maintained by an employee injured in Texas
where the evidence showed a continuous and regular solicitation of freight
and passenger business in the Southern District of New York and the
maintenance of certain stock facilities in that jurisdiction.3
Mrs. Pickthall was able to bring suit in New York for the wrong-
ful death of her brakeman husband against the Butte, Anaconda &
Pacific Ry. Co., with no lines west of Montana and which solicited no
business in New York, but which had its Board of Directors meetings in
New York City.4
THE DISCRETIONARY RESTRICTION
Superimposed upon the broad latitude granted injured railroad work-
ers with respect to the choice of venue in the Federal Court is 28 U.S.C.
1404(a), which provides as follows:
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the inter-
ests of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been brought."
The Supreme Court -has held that actions brought under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act are subject to the discretion given the Court.5
For several years the majority of the District Judges were of the
view that Section 140 4 (a) was a statutory enactment of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens and that therefore the plaintiff's choice was en-
titled to considerable weight. The defendant was required to unequivocally
and definitely show a strong and clear case of convenience to warrant
the transfer.6 However in Norwood v. Kirhkpatrick,7 the Supreme
Court, by a divided court, made it dear that 1404(a) had introduced
into our jurisprudence a species of discretion with respect to transfer
which was strictly of statutory origin, and in that case the Supreme Court
permitted an order transferring a Federal Employers' Liability Act case
from Pennsylvania, where the plaintiff resided and where all of the medi-
cal witnesses resided, to South Carolina, where the accident had occurred
and where witnesses with respect to liability were alleged to be more
readily available. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, of
3 Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 166 F. 2d 788, C.A. N.Y. 1948, cert.
den. 335 U.S. 814. To same effect see: Nunn v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pacific R R. Co., 71 F. Supp. 541; Butts v. Southern Pacific Co., 69 F. Supp. 895.
4 Pickthall v. Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. Co., 73 F. Supp. 694.
5 Ex Parte Collet, 337 U.S. 55, and Kilpatrick v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.,
337 U.S. 75.
6 Skultety v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 91 F. Supp. 118.
7 Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U. S. 29.
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course, the plaintiff's choice of his own residence as the venue would have
controlled.
It would now appear, therefore, that if venue is selected by plaintiff's
counsel in a forum other than that in which the accident occurred, the
plaintiff's counsel must be prepared to try two lawsuits, and that he must
marshall for his first lawsuit on the balances of conveniences, all of the
equities which may possibly affect the discretion and judgment of the
Judge. Considerations which have reportedly influenced trial judges
in granting or denying motions for transfer under Section 140 4 (a)
include the following:
(a) Place of residence of the plaintiff;
(b) The location of the defendant's claim office which served
as the center of operations for conducting the investigation;
(c) The location of defendant's main office;
(d) The convenience of witnesses:
(1) whether or not these witnesses can be brought to the
forum without cost to the defendant over its lines;
(2) whether or not the testimony of such witness is
critically relevant;
(3) whether or not the testimony of such witness is in
sharp dispute;
(4) where the extent of damages is a major factor, the
location of the treating doctors and hospitals and their
convenience as opposed to the location of examining
experts.
(e) The level of jury verdicts in the proposed transferee dis-
trict;
(f) The docket conditions in the proposed transferee circuit.
It will be readily seen that the marshalling of the evidentiary
material necessary to try this preliminary issue may call for thorough
investigation and the utilization of discovery procedures, including inter-
rogatories, the discovery of statements, photographs, medical reports, hos-
pital records and depositions of witnesses.
While the winning of such a motion may necessarily entail a great
deal of effort on the part of counsel, the stakes oft-times fully justify
the energy and acumen required because of the tremendous discrepancy
in the level of jury verdicts between the venue selected and the pro-
posed transferee district.
STATE COURTS
Up to this point we have only been considering actions commenced
in the Federal Court. It will be recalled that the State courts are given
concurrent jurisdiction. Once an action under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act is commenced in the State court it may not be removed
to the District Court even though there be diversity. The prohibition
against such removal was originally contained in 45 U.S.C. 56. It is
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now found in 28 U.S.C. 1445,8 and is frequently overlooked.
Since the plaintiff has a choice between bringing his action in the
State or Federal court, it is important that this choice be based on a
mature consideration of a number of factors.
WHICH COURT-STATE OR FEDERAL?
ATTORNEY'S CHECK LIST
1. Will the preparation of this case require the utilization of the
discovery rules contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? Can
an equally good job of preparation be done under the State procedures?
In the Federal Court, under Rules 33-36, the plaintiff is permitted
a veritable fishing expedition in order to obtain statements and photo-
graphs and quiz prospective witnesses. In many States examinations before
trial are restricted to parties. On the other hand, in some States parties
may be examined by their employees and such depositions, or any parts
thereof, can be used to prove the plaintiff's prima facie case, whereas
in the Federal Court, under Rule 36, only the deposition of an officer
or managing agent can be so used.
2. What is the condition of the dockets? How long a wait will
there be if the action is filed in the Federal Court as opposed to the
State Court?
3. Is a unanimous verdict required in the State Court, as it is in
the Federal Court?
A unanimous verdict is required in the Federal Court. This
means that the defendant only has to convince one juror in order to
cost the plaintiff either his verdict or a substantial portion thereof. In
some States a plaintiff may get a verdict by the concurrence of 9 jurors, and
in others by 10, and in those States, of course, the defendant would have
to convince either 4 or 3 jurors, as the case may be, in order to have
the same impact on the amount of the verdict.
4. Are the methods of selecting jurors the same in the State Court
as in the Federal Court?
The experienced lawyer practicing in a given community becomes
aware of differences between the caliber of juries selected in State
and Federal courts. This is usually by reason of the system whereby
these jurors are selected. Generally speaking, the observation may
be made that the jurors in the Federal courts, because of the Jury
Commissioner system employed in the Federal system, tend to be
somewhat more of the "blue ribbon" variety than those of the usual
State court. Whether this is good or bad for the plaintiff in an individual
case depends, of course, upon a knowledge of the facts and personalities
involved and enters so deeply into the realm of speculation that it would
be folly to do more than suggest that there is room here for knowledge
and the exercise of judgment.
8 28 U.S.C. 1445: "Carriers; Non-Removable Actions. (a) A civil action in
any state court against a railroad or its receivers or trustees, arising under Sections
51-60 of Title 45, may not be removed to any district court of the United States".
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5. What is the personality of the Judge or Judges who might try
the case or pass upon it in the Appellate Court?
This too is a most involved problem, and one which can only be
accurately analyzed and answered by the seasoned practitioner. In time
attorneys become familiar with the habits and the philosophy of trial
judges. There is a wide variance in the way particular judges conduct
procedures in the courtroom, in the degree of latitude which they per-
mit counsel, the manner in which they charge, their attitudes with
respect to the admissibility of demonstrative evidence, their attitudes
with respect to the use of blackboards, and their philosophy on the
sanctity of the jury verdict as compared with their own personal
judgment, even though the trial is being conducted free from appeals
to passion or sympathy. Intertwined with these considerations are
the attitudes of the Appellate Courts, particularly with respect to
the question of damages in heavy personal injury cases. These atti-
tudes run a wide gamut from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It is well
known amongst trial men, for example, that certain Appellate Courts are
notorious for ordering remittiturs. In the Federal system, on the other
hand, the very constitutional power of the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals to review the denial by the trial court of the motion for a new
trial on the ground that the verdict is excessive, was challenged in Neese
v. Southern Railway Co.9 In this significant case, while the Court refused
to decide the constitutional question, it did hold that it was error for the
Court of Appeals to regard the denial of the new trial upon a remittitur
of part of the verdict as an abuse of discretion, finding as it did that there
was some support in the record for the action of the trial judge. The
practical import of this decision is that it would appear that the Court
of Appeals in the Federal system should not be expected to order a remit-
titur on damages after a District Judge has conscientiously refused to do
so. This may very well be a determining factor in a heavy damage case
on choosing between the State and Federal court.
6. What will happen if venue is improper?
In the Federal Court, we have already observed that venue may
be changed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a). The Supreme Court
has made it clear in Missouri v. Mayfield" that the individual State
courts may dismiss an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act on the grounds of forum non conveniens, providing (a) that the
doctrine has been adopted in general litigation in the particular State
involved, and (b) that there is no discrimination as between citizens
and non-citizens in the application of the doctrine. Before a suit is
commenced on behalf of a non-resident in the State court it is
therefore essential that this question be briefed and analyzed for
the particular State involved. The risks of being wrong are very grave
and in cases of doubt the safe practice is for the attorney to maintain
9 Neese v. Southern Ry. Co., 76 S. Ct. 131, reversing 216 F. (2d) 772.
10 Missouri v. Mayfield, 71 S. Ct. 1.
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suits simultaneously both in the State and in the appropriate Federal court,
dismissing the latter after the jurisdictional and venue problems have
been resolved in the State court action. Of course, there must also be
considered individual State court rules which provide for changes of
venue within the State for the convenience of witnesses.
CONCLUSION
From this demonstration of the various considerations which are
involved in the choice of a court for the bringing of an action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, it must be painfully apparent that the
problem is an extreme complex and that even at this initial step in the
handling of a lawsuit for a seriously injured railroad worker there is a
genuine need for competent and experienced counsel. Indeed, the prob-
lems of law and the evidentiary problems involved in successfully repre-
senting an injured railroad worker are often relatively easy in compari-
son with the problem just considered. This is an unfortunate develop-
ment for the injured railroad worker and accounts in part for the inor-
dinate disparity of results obtained both in settlement and trail for com-
parable injuries.
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